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THE NOT SO FINE PRINT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
John-Mark Stensvaag*
In the twenty-five years that I have been studying, practicing, teaching, and writing about environmental law, one development strikes me as
more significant than any other: Environmental law has been transformed from a discipline of broad phrases into a realm dominated by fine
print. I well remember sitting in Professor Louis Jaffe's class, discussing
such vague concepts as "reasonable man," "prudent and feasible alternative," "abnormally dangerous activity,.... suitability to the locality," "intentional invasion," "reasonable use," "gravity of harm," and "utility of
conduct." These malleable phrases were the hallmark of the first Earth
Day's environmental law.
Today, introductory environmental law courses build on the foundational recognition that a regime of broad phrases fails adequately to
address modern environmental problems. The solution, as everyone
knows, has been fine print-particularized wording crafted by legislatures and administrative agencies. As one who has published and regularly supplements two multivolume treatises (on air pollution and
hazardous waste), I can attest that the quantity of minutely detailed language in modern environmental law beggars description. The Clean Air
Act's' comparison to the tax code is legendary. And the federal hazardous waste regulations defy the comprehension of any one person.
In some ways, the increasingly detailed codification of environmental law is a healthy and a natural development. As polluters find ways to
wiggle out of existing obligations, regulators find it necessary to tighten
the screws with ever more detailed directives. And as foot-dragging bureaucrats fail to carry out the broadly worded mandates of legislatures,
legislators find it necessary to hem the agencies in with ever more specific
* Professor of Law, University of Iowa College of Law; B.A., 1969, Augsburg College;
J.D., 1974, Harvard University School of Law. The illustrations used in this Essay are thor-

oughly explored, with full citations to the governing law, in I JOHN-MARK STENSVAAG, HAZARDOUS WASTE LAW AND PRACTICE § 5.7 (1986 & Supp. 1993), available in WESTLAW,
TP-ALL Database; 2 id. §§ 7.6, 7.12-.18 (1989); 1 JOHN-MARK STENSVAAG & CRAIG N.
OREN, CLEAN AIR ACT: LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 2.9-.10, 5.14-.15, 5.23, 5.40, 5.49, 5.53
(1991), available in WESTLAW, TP-ALL Database.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
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instructions. Much modem environmental law is comprised of finemeaning excellent-print.
Unfortunately, however, much environmental law today is "fine
print" in the pejorative sense. The dictionary defines "fine print" as
"something... presented in a deliberately ambiguous or cryptic manner."2 But the phrase conjures up more than this definition would suggest. To the layperson, "fine print" has three attributes: (1) It is hidden
and difficult to detect; (2) it has been crafted by someone who seeks to
use it to his or her advantage; and (3) it leads to unexpected outcomes.
The point of this Essay is that much modem environmental law consists
of this not so fine print. Two illustrations should suffice.

I. A HAZARDOUS

WASTE LOOPHOLE

We take our first example from the law of hazardous waste. Over
the past fifteen years, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has
devised an elaborate definition of the term "hazardous waste"-the
dreaded label that determines whether a material is subject to the complex regulatory requirements of Subtitle C of the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA).3 These requirements are so onerous
and so costly that potentially regulated entities do everything in their
power to avoid the hazardous waste designation.
When Congress set the definitional process in motion, it instructed
the Agency to define hazardous wastes in two ways: (1) by specifying
characteristics (or attributes) that, when present, would make any solid
waste material a hazardous waste; and (2) by affirmatively listing specified materials as hazardous wastes. After a false start, in which the EPA
proposed to enumerate approximately one dozen characteristics, the
Agency settled on only four: ignitability, corrosivity, reactivity, and an
extraordinarily narrow attribute of toxicity. As a result, carcinogens,
mutagens, infectious agents, radioactive materials, and most toxic materials will be hazardous wastes only if the EPA has taken the laborious
steps of discovering and listing them. I have called this regulatory approach the "listing preference," because the EPA has preferred to list
carcinogens, for example, rather than to define carcinogenicity as a characteristic of hazardous waste.
One consequence of the listing preference, of course, is that the
wording of the EPA's hazardous waste lists has become critically important. Not surprisingly, given the stakes involved, the hazardous waste
2. AMERICAN HERITAGE ELECTRONIC DICTIONARY (1992).

3. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6921-6939(e) (West 1983 & Supp. 1993).
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lists involve some of the finest print in all of environmental law. We
focus, here, on one aspect of the fine print, which I have called the "sole
active ingredient formulation loophole." To understand its significance,
we must retrace our steps a bit and focus on the nature of one portion of
the hazardous waste lists: the lists of commercial chemical products.
In the commercial chemical product lists, the EPA has enumerated
almost 350 dangerous chemical compounds- ordinarily traded as valuable commodities in commerce-that are hazardous wastes when, and if,
they become solid wastes. The lists include well-known materials (benzene, carbon tetrachloride, chloroform, mercury, sulfuric acid, and vinyl
chloride) and materials with names that only a chemist could love (3,6Pyridazinedione, 1,2-dihydro-). They also include-in a separate list of
"acutely hazardous" chemical compounds-substances that are used as
pesticides and that are deadly in even small amounts (aldrin, endrin, and
parathion). It is surely a good development that these things have been
listed. After all, if any materials are hazardous wastes when discarded,
these substances fit the bill.
But the meaning of the commercial chemical product lists is controlled by two aspects of the fine print, which I call the "enumerated
form principle" and its "mere ingredient corollary." Under these rules,
a listed chemical substance (such as parathion) is a hazardous waste only
if it appears in one of the forms enumerated on the list (for example, a
"commercial chemical product"); parathion is not a hazardous waste if it
is merely an ingredient in a nonenumerated form (for example, a bucket
of waste materials ejected from a manufacturing operation), even if it is
the predominant ingredient.
As we delve deeper into the fine print, we discover that the most
important enumerated form--"commercial chemical product"-is itself
defined to include only: (1) the pure grade of the listed chemical compound (and any technical grades that are essentially pure); and (2) "formulations in which the chemical is the sole active ingredient." 4 Thus, if
parathion is sold in commerce in its pure (or technically pure) form, that
material is a hazardous waste when, and if, it becomes a solid waste. But
pure compounds are seldom traded in commerce. Instead, they are sold
in "formulations," in which they have been mixed with other materials to
form useful commodities, such as the pesticides available at lawn and
garden stores. Thus, the fine print of the commercial chemical product
lists provides that a pesticide formulation containing parathion, for example, will not be a hazardous waste unless parathion is the sole active
4. 40 C.F.R. § 261.33(d) cmt. (1992).
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ingredient. Indeed, if a formulation contains two active ingredients
(parathion and aldrin), each of which appears on the list of commercial
chemical products, the formulation will bizarrely escape hazardous waste
status. Why? Because neither deadly substance is the sole active
ingredient!
It does not take a rocket scientist to recognize that the sole active
ingredient limitation is a loophole of irresistible beauty to the manufacturers and formulators of pesticides and other products containing the
listed commercial chemical product ingredients. One of my students sent
me a calendar page, setting forth the Second Rule of Environmental Protection: "The most efficient way to dispose of toxic waste is to reclassify
the waste as non-toxic." Indeed. In this instance, the fine print requires
only that the manufacturer or formulator devise a product so that it contains more than one active ingredient. Not surprisingly, my unscientific
survey of household pesticide products bears this out; the products invariably list more than one active ingredient. Moreover, at least some
products list as their second (and only additional) active ingredient "petroleum distillate," even though the EPA noted, when it first developed
this harebrained scheme, that petroleum distillate solvents are classic inert ingredients. To make matters even worse, the EPA has no control
over such manipulative labeling, because its regulations fail to define the
magical-"all we need is two of these"-phrase "active ingredient."
The issue here is not whether parathion-laced products will end up
in municipal solid waste landfills, thereafter leaching into the groundwater after being discarded by individual homeowners. The trickle of
household hazardous wastes forming the flood of such substances arriving at municipal landfills is, indeed, a disturbing problem, but that problem arises from a separate Subtitle C exclusion for household wastes;
even sole active ingredient parathion formulations (if there were any such
oddities) would be exempt from hazardous waste regulation when discarded by households. Rather, the sole active ingredient formulation
loophole is important because of what it says to the manufacturers, formulators, and others who are not end users of dangerous chemical products. As long as they take advantage of the loophole, these actors are
free under RCRA Subtitle C to discard tons of poisonous chemicals-for
example, materials defectively formulated, damaged in transit, produced
in amounts exceeding demand, or outliving their shelf lives-without any
more care than would be taken in discarding banana peels.
The sole active ingredient formulation loophole is fine print in the
pejorative sense: (1) It is hidden in the convoluted clauses of the EPA's
hazardous waste regulations; (2) its peculiar nature suggests the finger-
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prints of the regulated industry; and (3) it eliminates from the RCRA
Subtitle C regulatory program deadly materials that one would assume,
by glancing at the commercial chemical product lists, are listed hazardous wastes being carefully shepherded from cradle to grave. As a result,
the vast majority of supposedly listed commercial chemical products are
not listed hazardous wastes at all.
II. A CLEAN AIR SCAM
Our second example comes from the Clean Air Act's nonattainment
program just prior to the 1990 amendments, specifically its innovative
offset trading scheme. We can understand the fine print, however, only
after being introduced to the big picture. The core of the Clean Air Act
has been its attempt to control six ubiquitous "criteria pollutants" by
establishing uniform National Ambient Air Quality Standards
(NAAQS). The state and federal governments are then supposed to pursue a partnership in limiting the emissions of these pollutants and their
precursors, so that compliance with the NAAQS is eventually achieved.
The state contribution to this effort must be set forth in a State Implementation Plan (SIP). The widespread failure to achieve these ambient
standards in so-called nonattainment areas has led to the nonattainment
program.
Perhaps the best way to envision nonattainment is to consider the
diagram in figure 1. If we consider the Y axis to represent increasing
ambient air concentrations of a pollutant and the X axis to represent the
passage of time, a nonattainment area is one for which existing ambient
concentrations of a given criteria pollutant exceed the relevant NAAQS.
The nonattainment program has been designed systematically to reduce
the ambient air concentrations of the pollutant through time, to assure
eventual attainment with the NAAQS by an extended deadline.
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The nonattainment program is extraordinarily complicated, but we
are concerned here only with its mechanism for blending industrial
growth into nonattainment areas. The problem is a critical and seemingly intractable one-how can desperately needed industrial growth
(with its associated jobs) be blended into an area in which the existing air
pollution is excessive? Won't any new industrial development simply
make the air worse? The answer given by the EPA and ratified by Congress is straightforward: We will allow industrial growth only if we have
created room for new emissions by "retiring" old ones in an amount sufficient to assure that "reasonable further progress" toward attainment is
achieved.
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The Clean Air Act envisions two ways in which such reasonable
further progress might be secured. First, states with nonattainment areas
were directed to revise their implementation plans to impose tougher,
technology-based standards-known as "reasonably available control
technology" (RACT)-on existing sources. Assuming for a moment
that attainment was to be achieved solely through the imposition of
RACT on existing sources, the progress from nonattainment to attainment is depicted diagrammatically in figure 2. If RACT achieved only
the results depicted in that diagram, of course, there would be no room
for new industrial development. Existing facilities could continue to operate and the NAAQS would be met, but industrial growth would cease.
How then could growth come about? The second aspect of the
Clean Air Act's nonattainment scheme provides two submechanisms.
First, the Act has recognized that RACT requirements might be so stringent that the imposition of these controls on existing sources would create extra room for new sources-a windfall vaguely referred to in the
statute as an "allowance" and which we call a "growth allowance." This
possibility-that existing sources would, in effect, be ordered to "move
over" and make room for new facilities-is depicted in figure 3 on the
next page.
Most nonattainment areas could not possibly find sufficient room for
growth merely by imposing RACT on existing sources. Accordingly, the
nonattainment program has authorized a second mechanism: the offset
program. Pursuant to this system, a new source may obtain permission
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to increase emissions of a nonattaining pollutant as long as it has obtained sufficient emission reductions (offsets) from existing sources to assure reasonable further progress toward nonattainment. The basic
notion is that the new facility will obtain-frequently through market
transactions-and "retire" more existing source pollution than would be
generated by its planned entry into the airshed. This possibility is depicted in figure 4.
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The "offset program" is one of the most brilliant innovations in
modem environmental law. Teachers and scholars love to discuss it, and
rightly so, because it cleverly harnesses market transactions to resolve
the implacable problem of growth in nonattainment areas. "Pollution for
Sale" reads the syllabus, and the class marvels at this shining example of
marketplace magic. Unfortunately, the offset program has been a hollow
charade, gutted by its fine print. Before we can understand this, we must
consider the role of the "offset ratio" in the Clean Air Act's nonattainment program.
The offset program can succeed in bringing about compliance by the
attainment deadline only if the ratio of retired to newly generated emissions is sufficiently great to bring about the necessary reductions in ambient air concentrations. The central importance of offset ratios to
reasonable further progress may be demonstrated by a crude illustration.
Assume that the ambient air quality of an area is so much in excess
of the NAAQS for a given pollutant that it is necessary to "retire" 5000
tons of emissions per year by the attainment deadline. If a new source
desiring to emit 300 tons per year of the nonattaining pollutant were to
obtain an offsetting emission reduction of a mere 300 tons from an existing facility, the ratio of new to old emissions would be 1:1, and there
would be no progress of any kind toward attainment. On the other hand,
if the new source were to obtain an offsetting emission reduction of 5300
tons per year from a single source, the ratio would be 5300:300, and attainment would be achieved through a single offset transaction, retiring
the offending 5000 tons per year of excessive emissions in one fell swoop.
Defining "reasonable further progress" requires a SIP's drafters
(and the EPA, when it reviews the SIP) to select a retirement ratio that
falls somewhere in between these extremes-great enough to assure attainment by the NAAQS deadline, but small enough to induce pollutant
trading. Unfortunately, there is no way to accurately select the genuinely necessary offset ratio without knowing in advance how many trading transactions will occur between the present time and the compliance
deadline. If only one transaction (at the illustrative size) will occur, the
ratio must, indeed, be the impossible one of 5300:300. If 100 transactions
of similar magnitude will take place, the ratio need only be 350:300, because each of the 100 offsets will retire 50 tons per year, resulting in a
total retirement of the necessary 5000 tons. If only fifty transactions of
this magnitude will occur, the ratio must be 400:300 (retiring 100 tons
per transaction) and so forth.
Moreover, because only "major stationary sources" are subject to
the nonattainment program and therefore required to obtain a permit,
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unregulated growth from minor facilities may well eat up any reasonable
further progress provided by the combined operation of the RACT emissions limitations and the offsets. Two variables are therefore essential to
the success of the offset program: (1) the number of facilities escaping
the requirement altogether because of the major stationary source definition; and (2) the offset trading ratio.'
Notwithstanding the critical importance of the offset retirement ratio to the success of the nonattainment program, the ratio itself has been
buried in the finest of print. In a lengthy appendix to its regulations
governing approval of state implementation plans, the Agency declared:
"As long as the emission offset is greater than one-for-one... EPA does
not intend to question a reviewing authority's judgment as to what constitutes reasonable progress ....6 To continue our illustration, therefore, a feeble 1.1:1 ratio satisfying this policy would be met by a
retirement of 330 tons per year, in exchange for the new emissions of 300
tons. If attainment could not be met without retiring a total of 5000
tons, acceptance of this ratio meant that more than 165 transactions of
similar size must occur to achieve compliance with the NAAQS, an occurrence that everyone knew to be preposterous. Moreover, because the
regulatory appendix indicated that any ratio greater than 1:1 would pass
EPA muster, even the absurd ratio of 1.01:1 would do!
Like the sole active ingredient formulation loophole, the pre-1990
offset retirement ratio was fine print in the pejorative sense: (1) It was
buried in an obscure appendix to the EPA's SIP-approval regulations; (2)
it favored the developmental interests from which it undoubtedly sprang;
and (3) it eviscerated an innovative pollutant trading program of great
promise, altering its outcome. Indeed, the offset ratio scam guaranteed
that air quality in nonattainment areas would almost surely get worse,
rather than better, notwithstanding the glorious trappings of the offset
program.
III.

So WHAT?

The point of these two examples is that a new age of what I would
call "microenvironmental law" is upon us-an age in which the minutiae
of environmental statutes and regulations have become extraordinarily
important. Nothing comparable to these examples could have occurred
5. The 1990 amendments tinker extensively with these two attributes of the nonattainment program, but the offset retirement ratios are still surprisingly low, ranging from 1.1:1
(moderate ozone nonattainment areas) to 1.5:1 (Los Angeles)-a number that may be cranked
back down to 1.2:1 if certain conditions are met.
6. 40 C.F.R. pt. 51 app. S.pt. IV.E (1992).
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twenty-five years ago, yet these illustrations are all too typical today.
Moreover, only a dreamer of the tax simplification variety would suggest
that this field will become a less complex and more broadly demarcated
discipline in the coming decades. The fine print is here to stay. As a
result, modem environmental law is seldom what it appears to be.
The rise of microenvironmental law has profound ramifications for
persons who study, practice, and implement this law, as well as those
who seek to shape and reform its content. Students must be forced to
confront the likelihood that their initial understanding of each environmental control scheme is misleading, because the scheme will be shown
to be vastly different once the fine print has been explored. Practitioners
must likewise shed their simplistic first impressions. Those representing
regulated entities will doubtless search for and exploit the fine print; after
all, that is why the print was created in the first place. Others, representing regulators and environmental advocacy groups, must attack the regulations with the tenacity of gardeners, seeking and rooting out whatever
weeds lie within their reach.
Ultimately, however, the task of clarifying microenvironmental law
will fall disproportionately on the shoulders of the academy. Environmental law scholars must continue to bring all of their analytic powers to
bear on what has become a truly frightening tangle of materials, illuminating the fine print and flushing it out for public scrutiny. What is
needed is the patient and thoughtful exposure of more minutiae, not less.
In the end, there is no other way. If we fail to plumb the fine print, we
deceive ourselves, and the real environmental law will surge along, hidden behind a facade that we all too simplistically embrace.
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